The economics of priority review vouchers.

Abstract

Priority review vouchers (PRVs) were introduced in 2007 by the US Congress as an incentive mechanism to spur pharmaceutical firms' R&D efforts for neglected diseases (NDs). A voucher, which a firm can obtain upon approval of a new treatment for NDs, entitles the holder to prioritize the FDA review for any drug. The proposal generated much controversy regarding its ability to effectively stimulate R&D for NDs. Here, after reviewing the main issues of the debate, i use a stylized economic model to discuss the strength of PRVs as an economic incentive to invest in research. My findings suggest that R&D investments might be higher when the developer could prioritize a valuable compound.

• Authors: Nicola Dimitri
• Journal: Drug discovery today (Drug Discov Today) Vol. 15 Issue 21-22 Pg. 887-91 (Nov 2010) ISSN: 1878-5832 [Electronic] England
• PMID: 20732445 (Publication Type: Journal Article)
• Copyright: Copyright © 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Topics

• Biomedical Research (economics)
• Drug Approval (economics)
• Drug Industry (economics)
• Humans
• Investments (economics)
• Models, Economic
• Neglected Diseases (economics)
• Orphan Drug Production (economics)
• Patents as Topic
• United States
• United States Food and Drug Administration